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I. INTRODUCTION

It's sort of fun to save someone's life-it's not an everyday chance.
-nine year old bone marrow donor
A donor made this statement the day after a bone marrow harvest and
transplant and appears to be a fairly typical sentiment of minor donors.5 Bone
marrow transplants from siblings are often the last and best chance to save the
lives of children and adolescents with leukemia and a variety of other serious
diseases. However, the legal basis for allowing minors to donate bone marrow
to their brothers and sisters, a procedure that entails some risk to the donor, has
not been satisfactorily articulated. Most courts faced with the question have
relied on the best interests of the child standard to ground the authorization of
these transplants and have, therefore, required a showing that the donation
was in the donor's best interest. These courts have emphasized the
psychological benefit that redounds to the minor donor who participates in the
procedure and potentially saves the life of his or her sibling.
However, a pure best interests standard does not fully capture the nature of
the decision to donate bone marrow, nor does it incorporate a respect for
persons that would protect the rights and dignity of the donor child. This article
examines the standards used for answering the question of whether minors
should be allowed to donate bone marrow. Part II introduces the legal
background and the standards currently used by courts. Part III explores the
unsatisfactory nature of these standards. Part IV presents an empirical study
that is intended to provide some help in understanding what might be a useful
5

Interview with nine year-old bone marrow donor in Minneapolis, MN (February

1994).
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and respectful standard. Part V concludes the article with a discussion of two
alternative revised standards grounded in the doctrines of substituted
judgment and the best interests of the child.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Bone Marrow Harvestsfrom Minors
Bone marrow transplants can often mean the difference between life and
death for children and adolescents with leukemia and other childhood cancers,
aplastic anemia, and immune deficiency diseases. 6 Because the bone marrow
for the transplant comes from another human being, one who is healthy, there
are important ethical issues to consider. One area of particular interest is
whether minors should be allowed or required to donate bone marrow to their
critically ill siblings7 The closer the tissue match is between the donor and the
recipient, the better are the chances of a successful transplant because genetic
similarity reduces the likelihood that the recipient's immune system will reject
the transplanted tissue or that the recipient will suffer from graft versus host
disease. 8 Therefore, biological siblings of the sick child are often the best source
of tissue to transplant.
This raises the question of whether a healthy child or adolescent should be
allowed or required to undergo a bodily invasion that is not physically
beneficial to him or her in order to possibly save the life of a sibling. 9 The law
has long protected against unwanted violations of the body. This is evidenced
by the statement that "[nlo right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference

6

Bone marrow transplantation has become an increasingly used treatment for

pediatric cancers over the last decade. Approximately 2,000 U.S. children and

adolescents undergo a bone marrow transplant each year for pediatric cancers, aplastic
anemia, and metobolic disorders. S.K. STEWART, BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTS: A BOOK
OF BASICS FOR PATIENTS

7

67 (1992).

See generally Victoria Weisz, Psycholegal Issues in Sibling Bone Marrow Donation, 2
ETHICs & BEHAV. 185,189 (1992).
8
Charles H. Baron et al., Live Organ and Tissue Transplantsfrom Minor Donors in
Massachusetts,55 B.U.L.REv. 159,159 (1975). Graftv. host disease occurs when the donor
bone marrow recognizes the recipient as a foreign environment and can cause rash,
jaundice, diarrhea, and death. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE
195 (Charles B.Clayman ed., 1989).
9
The procedure is typically performed while the donor is under general anesthesia.
Three to five percent (one or two pints) of the donor's bone marrow is removed with a
long hollow needle from several locations on the pelvic bone. The marrow is processed
and is then transplanted into the recipient whose own bone marrow has been destroyed
with drugs and/or radiation to allow for the transplanted bone marrow. The donor's
bone marrow replenishes itself within a few weeks. ROBERTA ALTMAN &MICHAEL SARG,
THE CANCER DICTIONARY 32-35 (1992).
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of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."10 Accordingly,
at least one court has upheld the power of a competent adult to refuse to
participate in a transplant as a donor,1 1 and other courts have refused to
disclose the names of potential donors without their consent. 12 In refusing to
require an adult to donate bone marrow to his cousin even though such refusal
meant that the cousin would die, the court in McFall v. Shimp said:
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that
one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take
action to save another human being or to rescue .... For our law to
compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do
so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a
rule which would know no
13 limits, and one could not imagine where
the line would be drawn.
In contrast, minors are not usually held to be legally competent to give or to
withhold consent.14 Instead, parents have traditionally been able to consent to
therapeutic medical treatment for their children. 15 A bone marrow harvest,
however, is not medically beneficial to the donor and, in fact, places that child
at some risk and in some discomfort.1 6 Although parents are normally assumed
to act in their children's best interests, the ability of the parents to act in the best
interests of the prospective donor when faced with the possible death of the

1OUnion Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (refusing to require a
plaintiff to submit to a medical examination to ascertain the extent of her injuries without
her consent).
11

McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D.&C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978).

12

See Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1983) (upholding hospital refusal to
disclose name of unrelated match who had indicated unwillingness to donate except
for family members); In re George, 625 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. 1982) (refusing to openadoption
records to provide sick individual with name of natural father who was unwilling to be
a donor).
13

McFall, 10 Pa. D.&C.3d at 91 (emphasis added).

14

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979). The doctrine of informed consent
requires thatconsent to health care be intelligent, knowing, andvoluntary. This doctrine
supports the ideal that the patient and physician together will determine the appropriate
course of treatment. ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE
ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 224 (1990).
15
Linda S. Ewald, Medical Decision Making for Children: An Analysis of Competing
Interests, 25 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 689, 691 (1982).
16

Baron et al., supranote 8, at 163 n.20. Thephysical risks include the risks attendant
to general anesthesia; slight risk of bone fracture, bone infection, or rupture of an artery;
and the possibility of skin scarring. Id. Psychological risks include the fearof operations,
fear of losing a body part, and the psychological harm that can result if the recipient

dies. Id.
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sick sibling has been questioned. 17 For example, the court in Curranv. Bosze
acknowledged the concern on the part of hospital officials that "the parent had
both a sick child and a healthy child, and in their desire for the sick child to get
better, they might.. . overlook the potential risks to the healthy child." 18
Bonner v. Moran19 has been cited as authority for the principle that a parent
may consent to non-therapeutic medical procedures for a child. 20 In that case,
a doctor was held liable for assault and battery for removing skin from a
fifteen-year-old boy to graft to his cousin without the consent of the boy's
parents. 21 However, as one commentator pointed out, the facts of the case
required only that the court hold that parental consent was necessary and did
not rule on whether or not parental consent would be sufficient to authorize a
non-therapeutic medical procedure on a minor.22 Similarly, in Zaman v. Schultz,
the court held a doctor liable for taking blood from a minor to transfuse to
another patient without the donor's parents' consent, but did not expressly
23
hold that such consent would have been sufficient.
While the Supreme Court has demonstrated in several contexts an
unwillingness to intervene in the decisions of parents regarding their
children, 24 the Court has also recognized that there are limits to parental
authority: "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they

17

1d. at 160; Thomas H. Murphy, Jr., Minor Donor Consent to Transplant Surgery: A
Review of the Law, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 149, 152 (1978).
18566 N.E.2d 1319,1337 (111. 1990).
19126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
20Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (Conn. Super Ct. 1972); Ewald, supra note 15, at
691.
21

Bonner, 126 F.2d at 122.

22

Rodney K. Adams, Live Organ Donors and Informed Consent: A Difficult Minuet, 8 J.
OF LEGAL MED. 555,577 (1987).
2319 Pa. D.&C. 309 (Cambria County Ct. 1933).
24
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the 1st and 14th
Amendments prevented the state from compelling respondents (Amish) to send their
children to formal high school until the age of 16); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (upholding an injunction against enforcement of a state statute that
required parents to send children between the ages of 8 and 16 to public school stating
that the statute "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the 14th Amendment precluded states from
prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to children in schools violated the 14th

Amendment).
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can make that choice for themselves. ' 25 Thus, it is unclear whether a parent
may give legal consent for their child to undergo a bone marrow harvest in
order to benefit a sibling.
B. StandardsUsed by Courts
Many of these cases, in which minors are called upon to donate tissue to their
siblings, do not go to court, being resolved instead through hospital
administrative procedures. This reflects an understanding on some level that
parental authority is sufficient to authorize the harvest. However, there is also
a body of case law that has attempted to address these questions. Courts facing
this dilemma 26 have relied on the mature minor doctrine, 27 the substituted
judgement standard, 28 the best interests of the child standard, 29 or a review of
the fairness and reasonableness of the parental decision. 30
1. Mature Minor Doctrine
Some minors possess the maturity and intellect to express their wishes, to
exercise responsible judgment, and to make complex decisions. 31 The law has
recognized this through the mature minor doctrine. Many states have
promulgated statutes that allow minors, on a finding a sufficient maturity, to
give legally effective consent to some types of medical treatment. A number of
statutes condition the provision of legally effective consent by minors on
attainment of a specific age (ranging between twelve and seventeen years old)

25
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding a state statute
prohibiting minors from selling in the streets in the context of distribution of religious
literature).
26Courts have been confronted with these questions in the contexts of kidney and
blood donations as well as bone marrow harvests and in situations where the
prospective donor is either mentally incompetent or incompetent due to minority. The
issues in these cases will be treated as the same unless otherwise stated.
27

Rappeport v. Stott, Civil No. J 74-57 (Mass. Aug. 28, 1974) (discussed in Baron et
al., supra note 8).
28
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
29
Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1322; In re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973); In
re Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975).
30

Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); Nathan v. Farinelli, Eq. No.
74-87 (Mass. July 3,1974) (discussed in Baron et al., supra note 8).
31See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A
Developmental Perspective,9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412 (1978); David G. Scherer, The Capacities
ofMinors to Exercise Voluntarinessin Medical TreatmentDecisions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
431 (1991); David G. Scherer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Adolescents' Capacities to Provide
Voluntary Informed Consent: The Effects ofParentalInfluence andMedical Dilemmas, 12 LAW
& HuM. BEHAV. 123 (1988); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of
Childrenand Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions,53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982).
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and/or limit the specific treatments for which such consent is deemed
32
adequate.
Some commentators have suggested that the mature minor doctrine does
not apply to the organ and tissue donation context because the procedure is
not physically therapeutic for the donor.33 These commentators would limit
minors' ability to give legal consent to those cases in which the treatment or
procedure is physically beneficial to the minor. However, at least one court has
allowed a seventeen year-old minor to donate bone marrow based solely on
the fact that he was capable of legal consent.34 Based in part on a psychiatrist's
opinion that the donor "should be allowed to make his own independent
decision about any matters affecting his welfare," the court held that the donor
was "capable of consenting to the proposed procedure so as to prevent the
creation of liability therefor.' 35 Moreover, several states have enacted statutes
that specifically allow some minors to give legally effective consent to a bone
marrow harvest.36 It has been suggested that, perhaps, a two-tiered structure
32

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 to -6 (1990) (authorizing minors fourteen-years-old or
older to give consent to any medical treatment and any minor to give consent to
treatment related to pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and chemical
dependency); CAL. FAMILY CODE § 6920 - 6929 (West 1994) (authorizing minors
fifteen-years-old and older to consent to most medical treatment and minors
twelve-years-old and older to consent to some mental health treatment, treatment for
substance abuse, and diagnosis and treatment of rape and of communicable diseases);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 577A -1to -2 (1985) (authorizing all minors to give consent for
treatment related to pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and family planning);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 3292 (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing any minor to give
consent for treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and substance abuse); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-101-104 (1990 & 1994 Supp.) (authorizing minors
seventeen-years-old and older to give consent for treatment of substance abuse, sexually
transmitted diseases, pregnancy, contraception, and rape exams and authorizing
minors sixteen-years-old and older to consent to treatment of mental or emotional
problems). Most states also have provisions allowing minors to give legally effective
consent if they are married or otherwise emancipated from theirparents. See OKLA. STAT.
tit.
63, § 2601 - 2602 (West 1984 & 1995 Supp.) for a typical example.
33
Ewald, supra note 15, at 703-04 ("often an adolescent minor has the intelligence and
maturity to understand the nature and consequence of the proposed treatment and is
thereby capable of consenting to beneficial treatment") (emphasis added); ANGELA

RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 134 (2d ed.

1985).
34
35
36

Rappeport, Civil No. J 74-57 (discussed in Baron et al., supra note 8, at 176).

1d.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-9 (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.34. (West 1989). The
Alabama statute provides:
Any minor who is 14 years of age or older, or has graduated from
high school, or is married, or having been married is divorced or is
pregnant, may give effective consent to the donation of his or her
bone marrow for the purpose of bone marrow transplantation. A
parent or legal guardian may consent to such bone marrow donation
on behalf of any other minor. Ala. Code § 22-8-9 (1990).
The Wisconsin statute is more detailed. In relevant part, it provides:
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(3) Consent to donation of bone marrow by a minor under 12 years
of age. If the medical condition of a brother or sister of a minor who
is under 12 years of age requires that the brother or sister receive a
bone marrow transplant, the minor is deemed to have given consent
to be a donor if all of the following conditions are met:
(a) The physician who will remove the bone marrow from the minor
has informed the parent, guardian or legal custodian of the minor of
all of the following:
1. The nature of the bone marrow transplant.
2. The benefits and risks to the prospective donor and prospective
recipient of performance of the bone marrow transplant.
3. The availability of procedures alternative to performance of a
bone marrow transplant.
(b) The physician of the brother or sister of the minor has determined
all of the following, has confirmed those determinations through consultation with and under recommendation from a physician other than
the physician under par. (a) and has provided the determinations of
the parent, guardian or legal custodian under par. (e):
1. That the minor is the most acceptable donor who is available.
2. That no medically preferable alternatives to a bone marrow
transplant exist for the brother or sister.
(c) A physician other than a physician under par. (a) or (b) has determined the following and has provided the determinations to the
parent, guardian or legal custodian under par. (e):
1. The minor is physically able to withstand removal of bone m
arrow.
2. The medical risks of removing the bone marrow from the minor
and the long-term medical risks for the minor are minimal.
(d) A psychiatrist or psychologist has evaluated the psychological status
of the minor, has determined that no significant psychological risks to
the minor exist if bone marrow is removed from the minor and has provided that determination to the parent, guardian or legal custodian
under par. (e).
(e) The parent, guardian or legal custodian, upon receipt of the information and the determinations under pars. (a) to (d), has given written
consent to donation by the minor of the bone marrow.
(4) Consent to donation of bone marrow by a minor 12 years of age or
over. (a) A minor who has attained the age of 12 years may, if the medical
condition of a brother or sister of the minor requires that the brother or
sister receive a bone marrow transplant, give written consent to be a donor if:
1. A psychiatrist or psychologist has evaluated the intellect and
psychological status of the minor and has determined that the minor is
capable of consenting.
2. The physician who will remove the bone marrow from the
minor has first informed the minor of all of the following
a. The nature of the bone marrow transplant.
b. The benefits and risks to the prospective donor and prospective
recipient of performance of the bone marrow transplant.
c. The availability of procedures alternative to performance of a
bone marrow transplant.
(b) If the psychiatrist or psychologist has determined under par. (a) that
the minor is incapable of consenting, consent to donation of bone marrow
must be obtained under the procedures under sub. (3).
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.34 (West 1989).
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might be used, with courts requiring "a higher level of competency to consent
to nontherapeutic procedures than is ordinarily required for therapeutic
37
procedures."
2. Substituted Judgment Standard
The substituted judgment standard originated to allow a surrogate
decision-maker to distribute an incompetent's property for the support of his
relatives by considering what the incompetent would do were he or she
competent. 38 Over the years, evidentiary requirements, such as evidence of
previous giving or of statements regarding intentions to give, were introduced
to increase the persuasiveness of the notion that the court could determine what
the incompetent person would do if he or she were competent.3 9 More recently,
substituted judgment has been used in the medical decision-making context in
cases that consider decisions at the end of life.40
Using a subjective form of substituted judgment, courts attempt to
determine what the incompetent person would have chosen, if competent,
based on his or her behavior and statements made in a prior period of
competency. Thus, the decision of a third party (e.g., the court or a family
member), advised by information about the incompetent person's wishes,
values, and goals, is substituted for the decision of the incompetent person.
When executing a decision based on the substituted judgment standard, a court
purports to "determine and effectuate, insofar as possible, the decision that the
patient would have made if competent. Ideally, both aspects of the patient's
right to bodily integrity - the right to consent to medical intervention and the
right to refuse it - should be respected." 41 In this way, the state affords respect
for individuals and protects "the same panoply of rights and choices it
recognizes in competent persons."42

37

Adams, supra note 22, at 577. Such a two-tiered structure has been suggested by

Buchanan and Brock in the different, but similar, context of consenting to versus refusing
therapeutic treatment.
[T]he fact that a child is competent to consent to a treatment does not
imply that he or she is competent to refuse it and vice versa. For example,
consent to a low-risk, life-saving procedure by an otherwise healthy child
should require a minimal level of competence, while refusal of that same
procedure by the child should require the very highest level of competence.
BucHANAN & BROCK, supra note 14, at 239-40.
38

Ex parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).

39

Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrineof Substituted

Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 24-29 (1990).
40See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
41In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (NJ. 1985).
42
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428
(Mass. 1977).
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Thus, in the context of a prospective minor bone marrow donor, this
standard would require the parent or the court to assess the minor's feelings,
values, and goals and to determine what the minor would have chosen if he or
she were competent. For example, in Strunk v. Strunk, the court, in authorizing
a kidney transplant from an incompetent person, Jerry, to his brother, examined
Jerry's reactions and values.43 The court noted the identification Jerry felt with
his brother, the importance to him of his brother's visits, the important role the
brother played in his improvement, Jerry's awareness that he played a role in
the relief of the family's tension, and the possibility of Jerry's guilt if his brother
were to die. Holding that the doctrine of substituted judgment was 'broad
enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters touching on the
well-being of the ward," the court held that it had the power to authorize the
transplant and that the transplant would further Jerry's interests. 44
3. Best Interests of the Child Standard
Some courts and commentators have argued that the substituted judgment
approach is not appropriate in the pediatric bone marrow transplantation
context as, by definition, minors have had no prior experience in legal
decision-making. The determination of what the minor would do if competent
45
is, therefore, thought to be too uncertain to justify putting the minor at risk.
Alternately, these courts consider what course of action is in the best interest
of the minor. An early expression of the best interests standard stated the goal
succinctly: "Above all things, the paramount consideration is, what will
promote the welfare of the child?"46
Because it is clear that acting as a bone marrow donor is not medically
therapeutic, the donation is not in the physical best interests of the donor
sibling. Thus, courts look to evidence of the psychological impact on the minor
of donating versus not donating in determining whether the harvest would be
in the donor's best interest. The best interest standard in this context turns on
whether the psychological outcome of the donation will be positive and, if so,
47
whether such a beneficial psychological result outweighs any physical risks.

43445 S.W.2d at 146-48.
44Id.
45

Curran,566 N.E.2d at 1326; David S. Lockemeyer, At What Cost Will the CourtImpose
a Duty to Preservethe Life ofa Child? 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 577, 586 (1991).
46

Chapsky v. Wood, 40 Am. Rep. 321 (1881).

47

To date, no studies have been completed that directly assess the question of

psychological benefits to minor bone marrow donors. Weisz, supra note 7, at 189. One
study has addressed the reactions of unrelated bone marrow donors to the death of the
recipient. The findings indicate that unrelated donors rarely experience guilt following
the death, but often experience fairly intense feelings of grief. However, this study used

a sample of adult, unrelated donors and its generalizability to child or adolescent
siblings is questionable. V.A. Butterworth et al., When Altruism Fails: Reactions of
Unrelated Bone Marrow Donors When the Recipient Dies, 26 CEGA 161 (1992-93).
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Some of the factors considered include: the quality and importance of the
relationship between the prospective donor and the recipient; 48 the physical
risks of the harvest to the prospective donor 4 9 the distress of the family;50 the
support available to the donor,51 the potential guilt should the child not donate
or should the child donate and the recipient die anyway,5 2 the recipient's
prognosis with and without the transplant;53 the availability of other medically
appropriate options;54 and the prospective donor's degree of understanding
of the situation and awareness of his or her role. 55
One factor that a court might consider is whether the donor is likely to derive
psychosocial benefits from being a bone marrow donor. Fellner and Marshall
studied adult kidney donors and found that the psychosocial consequences of
donating included increased self-esteem, growth as a person, and satisfaction
in the recovery of the recipient, as well as an identification of the experience as
one of the most meaningful in the donor's life.56 Bernstein and Simmons
studied kidney donors, including a small sample of adolescents, and found that
the donors experienced gratitude from the recipient and the rest of the family
and felt personally rewarded because they had saved another's life. In addition,
they found that the adolescents experienced increases in self-esteem that were
even greater than those experienced by a comparison group of adults. 57 Freund
and Siegel commented on the special closeness that characterizes the
relationship between many bone marrow donors and their sibling recipients
following the transplant.58

48

See, e.g., Hart,289 A.2d at 389; Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1343; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at

146; Little 576 S.W.2d at 498.
49

See, e.g., Hart, 289 A.2d at 389; Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1337; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at

148-49; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499.
50See, e.g., Hart, 289 A.2d at 389.
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See, e.g., Curran,566 N.E.2d at 1335.
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See, e.g., Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1335; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 147.
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See, e.g., Hart, 289 A.2d at, 388; Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1333; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at

147; In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 187; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499.
54
See, e.g., Hart,289 A.2d at 388; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146; In re Richardson, 284 So.
2d at 187; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 497; In re Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 181.
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See, e.g., Hart,289 A.2d at 389; Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1334; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at
146; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 498.
56
Carl H. Fellner & John R. Marshall, Kidney Donors Revisited, in ALTRUISM AND
HELPING BEHAVIOR 351 (J.P. Rushton & R.M. Sorrentino eds., 1981); Carl H. Fellner &
John R. Marshall, Kidney Donors: The Myth of Informed Consent, 126 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY
1245 (1970).
57
Dorothy M. Bernstein & Roberta G. Simmons, The Adolescent Kidney Donor: The
Right to Give, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1338 (1974).
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Barbara L. Freund & Karolynn Siegel, Problems in TransitionFollowing Bone Marrow

Transplantation:PsychosocialAspects, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 244 (1986).
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Some courts have embraced psychological testimony regarding the impact
of the options surrounding organ or tissue donation and have used it as a basis
for authorizing the harvest:
I am satisfied from the testimony of the psychiatrist that grave
emotional impact may be visited upon Leonard [prospective donor] if
the defendants refuse to perform this operation and Leon [prospective
recipient] should die, as apparently he will. Such emotional
disturbance could well affect the health and future well-being of
Leonard for the remainder of his life. I therefore find that this operation
is necessary for the continued good health and future well-being of
are
Leonard and that in performing the operation the defendants
59
conferring a benefit upon Leonard as well as upon Leon.
Other courts have declined to authorize transplants after finding that no benefit
to the donor had been established. 60
4. Fairness and Reasonableness of the Parental Decision
Some courts have elected to conduct a review of the parental decision, in
which the court objectively examines the parents' motivation and reasoning in
reaching the decision to consent to the harvest. 61 This method of review
recognizes the parents' "right and responsibility" to make the decision while
concurrently allowing the court to monitor the decision to ensure that the
parents, who have a conflict of interest, will give due consideration to the risks
faced by the healthy child. 62 In doing so, the court weighs the interests of both
children and the family to ensure that the decision made by the parents is "fair

59

Madsen v. Harrison Eq., No. 68651 (Eq. Mass. Sup.Jud. Ct. June 12,1957) (emphasis
added). See also In re Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 932; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 493.
60

Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1319 (declining to authorize a bone marrow transplant
because the evidence supported the guardian ad literm's recommendation that "it is not
in the best interest of either Allison or James to undergo the proposed bone marrow
harvesting procedure"); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 185 (finding that the "surgical
intrusions and loss of a kidney clearly would be against Roy's best interest"); In re
Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 180 ("In the absence of real consent on his part, and in a situation

where no benefit to him has been established" the court refused to authorize a kidney
transplant). These are the only identified reported cases in which the court did not
authorize the transplant. In these cases, the courts found that there were factors which
may have mitigated against the harvest. In Richardson, the parents of the incompetent

prospective donor were in disagreement over whether the harvest should take place; in
Pescinskia competent brother of the recipient refused to be tested for compatibility; and
in Curran the mother of the prospective donors would not consent to their acting as
donors (in fact, would not consent to their even being tested) for their half-brother.
61
Hart, 289 A.2d at 386; Nathan, No. 74-87 (discussed in Baron et al., supranote 8).
62

Baron et al., supra note 8, at 171-76.
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and reasonable."63 Thus, reviewing the parental decision involves, at least in
part, an assessment of the best interests of the prospective minor donor.
In reviewing the fairness and reasonableness of the parental decision, one
court considered the testimony of a clergyperson indicating that "the decision
by the parents of the donor and donee was morally and ethically sound" and
the testimony of the parents which revealed that they had only been able to
make the decision "after many hours of agonizing consideration." 64 The court
concluded that parents ought to be able to consent to organ donation "when
their motivation and reasoning are favorably reviewed by a community
representation which includes a court of equity" and, accordingly, the court
authorized the transplant. 65
III. STANDARDS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY

Courts have used each of these standards to resolve cases involving organ
and tissue donations by minors. However, each of these standards has proven
to be limited in the extent to which it can provide the legal basis for these
decisions. While the mature minor standard is substantively acceptable, it is so
narrow in scope as not to apply in most cases. Conversely, the other doctrines
(best interests, substituted judgment, and the fairness and reasonableness of
parental decisions), while potentially applicable to a wide range of cases, are
substantively problematic.
A. MatureMinor Standard
The mature minor approach provides those minors who are sufficiently
mature and intelligent with the opportunity to make a variety of their own
health care decisions. This doctrine allows minors to attempt to rebut the law's
presumption of their incompetence by showing that their decision-making
abilities are developed enough that they should be found competent to decide
for themselves on a particular question.66 However, this doctrine only applies
to a small percentage of minor bone marrow donors. Many mature minor
statutes only allow minors above a certain age (ranging from 12 to 17) to make
their own decisions and some require a finding of sufficient maturity.67 In
addition, many statutes authorize minors to give legally effective consent only
in specific health care contexts such as pregnancy or substance abuse. 68 These
requirements combine to severely limit the instances in which minors can
consent to bone marrow harvests under these statutes. Moreover, if a two-tiered

63/d.
64
65

Hart,289 A.2d at 389-90.
1d. at 391.

66

BuCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 14, at 225.

67

See generally supra note 31.

68

id.
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standard is applied, requiring an even greater level of maturity to consent to
nontherapeutic procedures, 69 then the mature minor doctrine will apply in
even fewer cases. While this may be a satisfactory resolution of the problem for
a few older minors, it will not have any applicability to the majority of minor
donors who are children and young adolescents.
B. Substituted Judgment Standard
The substituted judgment standard is also not entirely satisfactory. In cases
involving minors, the potential donors have never been legally competent and
have, thus, never been able to provide the kind of legal evidence, such as prior
gifts and expressions of intent, that courts eventually look to in determining
what the wishes of the incompetent would be if he or she were competent.
Consequently, it is argued that the court can only speculate as to what this
minor might do if and when he or she became an adult. For example, the court
in Curran v. Bosze stated that "[i]t is not possible to discover the child's 'likely
treatment/nontreatment preferences' by examining the child's 'philosophical,
religious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the
way it should be lived, and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures,
suffering and death. ' '7 0
If parents are given the authority to substitute their judgment for the child,
they will undoubtedly be strongly influenced by what they hope their child
would do if he or she were competent. Thus, parental aspirations for their child,
usually including generosity and love toward the ill sibling, seem likely to bias
the substituted judgment that they or the court reach for their child. Most courts
have, thus, rejected the substituted judgment standard in the context of
donations by minors because of the low degree of confidence they have in the
prediction of what the child would do if competent.
C. Best Interests of the Child Standard
Most courts have, instead, adopted the best interests of the child standard.
These courts argue that substituted judgment is not the appropriate standard
to be applied because there is no previous period of competency upon which
to base the substituted judgment. 71 However, thebest interests standard is itself
unsatisfactory in that it fails to capture the nature of the decision to donate bone

69

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

70

Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1326 (quoting In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (111.
1989)). See also Murphy, supranote 17. Murphy argues that in the case of a child there is
"no period of prior competency upon which to evaluate his values, desires, or
preferences in terms of the 'judgment' to be substituted. Thus, any meaningful effort to
ensure respect for dignity and integrity of the incompetent individual or minor is
necessarily undertaken without satisfactory guidelines or safeguards" and the analysis
therefore becomes one of what is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 156.
71

See, e.g., Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1319; Murphy, supranote 17, at 156.
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marrow and, accordingly, does not further a respect for the personhood of the
children involved.
Even very young children facing bone marrow harvests are often able to
understand what is happening and why, at least on an elementary level. One
nine-year-old donor described the process as: 'They had to kill all his [her
brother's] cells so my bone marrow and the stuff he had left would not fight.
Then he had to have chemo and radiation and then they took the bone marrow
from me and put it into him.' 72
It has been suggested that under the best interests standard, the fact that the
donor is willing to undergo the harvest should be used as evidence that the
harvest is, indeed, in that child's best interests. 73 However, there is considerable
evidence that decisions whether or not to donate tissue or organs are not
governed by the type of thinking reflected in the best interests standard. That
is, people undertaking to decide whether to donate do not tend to weigh the
costs and benefits and to choose the alternative with the highest net benefit.74
Simmons and her colleagues studied the decisions of donors and non-donors
in the context of kidney transplants. They found that most people engaged in
moral decision-making rather than following a rational decision process
involving "deliberation and rational weighing of alternatives followed by a
clear decision." 75 The process of moral decision-making involves awareness on
the part of the potential donor that his or her actions have consequences for the
welfare of another person, ascription of some responsibility to him or herself,
and acceptance of a relevant moral norm (e.g., donation as an act of virtue or
obligation). 76 The researchers gave examples of the responses of their subjects:
"Ididn't sit and consider the pros and cons. It was just a matter of priority and
this was top priority." and "Me? I never thought about it. When we were typed
72
lnterview with nine year-old bone marrow donor in Minneapolis, MN (February,
1994).
73

Baron et al., supra note 8, at 179.

A reasonable implication of this is that the individual's wishes should
be accepted as evidence of his best interest, even when society believes
that the individual is too young to make the ultimate choice himself.
In transplant cases, it is suggested that courts treat the willingness of
the prospective donor to participate as positive evidence that the
donation would be in his best interest.
Id.
74See, e.g., Bernstein & Simmons, supra note 57; Fellner & Marshall, supra note 56;

Roberta G.Simmons et al., The FamilyMember's Decision to be a Kidney TransplantDonor,
4 J.COMP. FAM. STUD. 88 (1973).
75
Simmons et al., supra note 74, at 89, 111-12. Fellner and Marshall report similar
findings: "Our findings were surprising. Not one of the donors weighed alternatives
and rationally decided... none had consulted his or her spouse." Fellner & Marshall,
supra note 56, at 1247.
76
Simmons etal., supra note 74,at 92-93 (discussing Shalom Schwartz, Moral Decision
Making and Behavior, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR 127 (J.Macaulay & L.
Berkowitz eds., 1970)).
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I automatically thought I'd be the one. There was no decision to make or sides
to weigh."7 7 Even those donors that did appear to have engaged in some
weighing of costs and benefits utilized normative criteria in "the very weighing
of costs against gains."78
Bernstein and Simmons studied adolescent kidney donors and found that
50% of the adolescent potential kidney donors in their sample "made a rapid,
instantaneous decision."79 Similarly, when asked how the decision to donate
bone marrow was made, one adolescent donor replied that while the choice
was hers and that she could back out at any time, "there wasn't even a choice
in it" because she loved her brother.80
Thus, the decision whether to donate tissue or organs does not typically
incorporate a rational weighing of costs against benefits. Accordingly, it is
inappropriate to impose a decision that is the result of such a rational weighing
on a minor who is capable of expressing his or her wishes. Robertson
commented that "the presence of benefit does not justify nonconsensual
intrusions on competent persons. Rather, the determinative factor appears to
be consent or choice - persons may choose or consent to actions which bring
them little or negative benefit. Respect for persons requires that incompetents
be similarly treated." 81
The lack of respect for persons implicit in the best interests standard in this
context emerges in the fact that it fails to allow children to act altruistically.
Rather, the best interests standard only allows children to act when it is in their
own best interest. One commentator noted:
Unfortunately, the best interests of the child standard, as it now
exists, suffers from an additional flaw: it imposes self-seeking values
upon children. It permits children to act only when it is in their best
interest, thereby foreclosing the possibility of altruistic or humane
behavior. Such an impoverished vision of children based on net
benefits fails to recognize the human element of childhood. Perhaps,
then, what is most objectionable about the standard as it now exists is
not that it imposes values on children, but that the values it imposes
are the 'wrong' ones, i.e. they are too narrow. Abetter judicial approach
to the best interests test would be one that nurtures altruistic tenden-
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1d. at 96.

7816% of their sample did not volunteer immediately but sought to further inform
their decision. Id. at 103-04.
79

Bernstein & Simmons, supra note 57, at 1339.
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Interview with adolescent bone marrow donor in Lincoln, NE (Spring 1993).

81John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 56 (1976).
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cies and recognizes that children, as well as adults, enjoy giving for the
sake of giving, and not just for some tangible reward. 8
D. Fairnessand Reasonablenessof the ParentalDecision
The review of the fairness and reasonableness of the parental decision
approach has been criticized in that it could lead to a donation that is against
the potential donor's best interests. 83 This could occur in situations in which
the donor's interests are outweighed by the recipient's and/or the family's
interest. In these cases, the parents are, "[i]n effect,... given the authority to
sacrifice the interests of the prospective donor if they reasonably conclude that
the costs to him are outweighed by the potential benefits to the recipient."84
Accordingly, proof of benefit to the donor would not be required under this
standard.
While competent adults are not required to donate tissue or organs unless
they consent even if it is in their best interest, this standard could require
children to donate in a situation that is not in their own best interest and to
which the child objects. To the extent that this is a criticism of a standard
utilizing a review of the fairness and reasonableness of the parental decision,
it is a criticism of all the standards discussed here. Thus, this standard is not
unique in potentially imposing an obligation on minors that is not imposed on
adults. Implicit in asking the question of whether and under what
circumstances a minor who is legally unable to consent should be allowed to
donate is the notion that some standard other than consent will be applied.
Because minors cannot legally consent to the procedure, any standard (other
than the mature minor standard) applied to allow donation cannot be based
directly on the minor's consent.
An approach in which a court reviews the parental decision for fairness also
suffers from the same infirmities as does the best interest of the child standard.
Because it focuses, in part, on the best interest of the child, this approach fails
to fully capture the nature of the decision to donate bone marrow. A review of
the fairness and reasonableness of the parental decision merely increases the
number of interests that are added to the equation, resulting in an even more
extensive weighing of costs and benefits that show little regard for the
non-rational, moral nature of the decision. Because a standard that approaches
the analysis of the decision from a perspective of balancing costs and benefits
rmisapprehends the fundamental character of the decision, it fails to further a
respect for persons and does not allow children to act altruistically in the
interests of another person.

82

Rachel M. Dufault, Bone Marrow Donations by Children: Rethinking the Legal

Framework in Light of Curran v. Bosze, 24 CONN. L. REv. 211, 237 (1991).
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Baron et al., supra note 8, at 172.
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IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY

One way to preserve respect for persons and to allow children to act
altruistically would be to revise the best interest standard to include the child's
wishes and the benefits of acting altruistically as important factors. A second
way to preserve such interests might be to resurrect the substituted judgment
standard if empirical data supports the notion that the court can determine
what the minor would do if he or she were competent. The doctrine of
substituted judgment was developed in part to protect individuals' ability to
choose their actions even if they were not able to assert their choices. 85
Incompetence seemed to be no reason to deprive them of their right to be
generous or to make sacrifices that they did not directly benefit from. While it
is impossible to know for certain what a particular minor would choose if he
or she were competent, it may be possible to obtain empirical evidence to aid
in estimating what minors would choose if competent. It would be instructive
to know what competent adults would do under the circumstances in which
minors are asked to donate to their siblings. If a significant number of adults
would donate bone marrow under the operative circumstances, it could be
used as evidence of what a minor under those same circumstances would
choose to do if competent. 86
A. Operative Factors Used by Courts
Anecdotal information presented to some courts indicates that, in general,
people do choose to donate tissue or organs to their brothers or sisters in order
to save their lives. For example, in Curran v. Bosze, the court heard testimony
from two doctors who indicated that in their respective experiences "10M. of
matched siblings have agreed to donate bone marrow to their siblings"87 and
that "[m]ost people inherently want to do it (donate bone marrow)." 88
The court opinions reflect a view of human relationships that suggests that
the closeness of the relationship between the potential donor and the recipient
as well as the availability of alternatives to the donation should affect the
decision whether to donate tissue.89 Given this conception of human nature,
one would expect people to be less likely to donate when the relationship is
more attenuated 90 and when there is an alternative available 91 and vice-versa.

85

Robertson, supra note 81, at 63.

86

See infra notes 124-53 for a discussion of how this evidence relates specifically to
the substituted judgment standard.
87
Curran,566 N.E.2d at 1333.
88Id. at 1336.

89See, e.g., Curran,566 N.E.2d 1319; Richardson, 284 So.2d 185; Little, 576 S.W.2d 493;
Hart,289 A.2d 386; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145.
90 See infra notes
91

92-101 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
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Thus, it would be informative to investigate whether the courts' assessment is
accurate, that is, whether people would, in fact, most often choose to donate
bone marrow to others and whether that decision is affected by the degree of
relationship and/or by the possibility of alternate donors.
1. Relationship
Many courts, regardless of the standard applied, have focused, in part, on
the relationship between the prospective donor and the recipient. 92 For
example, one of the three critical factors identified by the court in Curran v.
Bosze was that:
[Tihere must be an, existing, close relationship between the donor
[T]he psychological benefit is not simply one of
and recipient ....
personal, individual altruism in an abstract theoretical sense, although
that may be a factor.
The psychological benefit is grounded firmly in the fact that the
donor and recipient are known to each other as family. Only where
there is an existing relationship between a healthy child and his or her
ill sister or brother may a psychological benefit to the child from
donating bone marrow to a sibling realistically be found to exist. The
evidence establishes that it is the existing sibling relationship, as well
as the potential for a continuing sibling relationship, which forms the
context in which it may be determined that it will be in the best interests
of the child
to undergo a bone marrow harvesting procedure for a
93
sibling.
94
In a number of other cases the courts relied on evidence of a close relationship,
evidence of strong identification between the prospective donor and his or her
sibling, 95 and predictions regarding the impact on the prospective donor were
his or her sibling to die.%
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While the study presented in this article examines the type of relationship between

the prospective donor and the recipient (i.e., parent-child, siblings, friends, strangers,
etc.), it appears that courts also consider the quality or closeness of the relationship. See
infra this section. There is some research regarding the closeness of the donor-recipient
relationship currently being conducted. For a description of this research see Eugene
Borgida et al., The Minnesota Living Donor Studies: Implicationsfor Organ Procurement,in
ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL FACTORS
108 (James Shanteau & Richard Jackson Harris eds., 1990).
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See, e.g., Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1343-44.

94

See, e.g., Little, 576 S.W.2d at 498 ("existence of a close relationship between Anne
and Stephen, a genuine concern by each for the welfare of the other").
95
See, e.g., Hart, 289 A.2d at 389 ("strong identification with her twin sister"); Strunk,
445 S.W.2d at 147 ("he identifies with his brother").
96
See, e.g., Hart,289 A.2d at 389 ("it would be a very great loss to the donor if the
donee were to die from her illness"); Little, 576 S.W.2d at 498 ("awareness by Anne of
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In the context in which the substituted judgment doctrine originated,
deciding whether to distribute the property of an incompetent person, the
relationship between the prospective donor and the recipient has long been an
important factor. In Ex parte Whitbread, the court considered the degree of
relationship between the incompetent person and the potential recipient in
97
attempting to determine what the incompetent person would have done.
Also in the context of property distribution, it has been commented that, "[i]f
evidence of past gifts or intention to give is absent, the closeness of the
applicant's relationship to the incompetent may provide sufficient assurance
" 98
that the incompetent would have made the gift if competent.
The following research empirically examines whether the relationship factor
operates as a decision factor for adults presented with a donation decision.
Specifically, it investigates general attitudes about sibling donation; whether
adults think that a decision to donate is more likely to occur for siblings than
for other types of relationships or non-relationships. There is some existing
empirical evidence to indicate the accuracy of the courts' belief that
donor-recipient relationship is a significant factor. Research has shown that
altruism within the family is common in the context of kidney donation, but
that the rate of offers to donate varies depending on whether the prospective
donor is a parent, child, or sibling.99 A study similar to this one asked students
to indicate their willingness to donate various organs and tissues in a number
of situations. Although the relative values for willingness varied across organs
and tissue, in each case the relationship to the recipient was an important factor.
Greater willingness to donate was shown when the recipient was the
prospective donor's child or sibling and less willingness to donate was shown
when the recipient was the prospective donor's friend or a stranger.lOO In
another context, it was found that children are more likely to donate candy to
a sibling than to a child they do not know.101

the nature of Stephen's plight and an awareness of the fact that she is in a position to
ameliorate Stephen's burden").
97
Ex parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
98

Robertson, supranote8l, at 60. Even this inference may be more limited. Robertson
continues: "This inference is usually confined to the immediate family-the spouse and
minor children. It is sometimes extended to parents and adult children and occasionally
to grandparents and siblings living with the incompetent. Beyond this immediate circle,
courts have been reluctant to exercise their power of substituted judgement." Id.
99

Roberta C. Simmons et al.,
GIFT OF LIFE: THE EFFECT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
ON INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, AND SOCIETAL DYNAMICS 203-04 (1987).
100james Shanteau & John J. Skowronski, The Decision to Donate Organs: An
Information-Integration Analysis, in ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION:
PSYCHOLOGICALAND BEHAVIORAL FACTORS 59 Uames Shanteau

&Richard Jackson Harris

eds., 1990).
10 1

Hing Keung Ma & Man Chi Leung, Effects of Age, Sex, and Social Relationships on the
Altruistic Behaviorof Chinese Children, 153 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 293 (1992).
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2. Uniqueness

Another factor emphasized by courts reviewing this issue is whether or not
there are alternatives to the transplant (either other donors or other treatments).
Courts approving transplants variously point out that the transplant is
necessary to save the sick child's life,102 that there are no medically acceptable
alternatives to a transplant,103 and that all other living relatives have been
tested and ruled out 104 In contrast, the court in In re Richardson, in declining to
authorize a kidney transplant from an incompetent to his sister, discussed the
possibility of a transplant from another of her siblings. 05 The court stated that
"neither a kidney transplant, nor particularly a transplanted kidney from Roy
[incompetent prospective donor], is an absolute immediate necessity in order
to preserve Beverly's life."106
The following study also examines whether adults think that a decision to
donate is more likely to occur when the actor is the only potential donor than
when there is another equally appropriate donor. Previous research with
kidney donors has found that willingness to donate varies with the number of
other prospective donors available with people showing greater willingness to
help if they are the only one available. 107 A similar phenomenon has also been
demonstrated in the context of bystander research. Darley and Latan6 showed
that people were less likely to offer aid in emergency situations when there
were other people present. 108
B. Decisions Under the OperativeFactors
This study was developed to assess the extent to which adults utilize
information regarding the relationship between a prospective donor and
recipient and whether there are other potential donors available in assessing
an individual's likelihood of donating. Previous research has shown that many
individuals, in responding to tests and inventories, tend to evaluate themselves
in a socially desirable manner. Specifically, the more socially desirable an item
or self-description is, the more likely it is to be marked as a description of the

10

2See, e.g., Hart, 289 A.2d at 391 ("the operation on the donee is a necessity for her

continued life"); Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 145.
103
See, e.g., Little, 576 S.W.2d at499 ("therewere no medically preferable alternatives").
104

See, e.g., Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 145; Little, 576 S.W.2d at 493.

105284 So. 2d at 187. The siblings' tissue matches were not as close as was the
incompetent's. There was a 4-5% risk of rejection of the incompetent persons tissue but
a 2 0- 3 0%risk of rejection of the siblings'. However, the court pointed out that successive
transplants were not precluded. Id.
106

Id.

10 7

Simmons et al., supra note 99, at 219.

8

10 John M. Darley & Bibb Latan6, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of
Responsibility, 8J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968).
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test taker.109 Further, it appears that there is extensive agreement on what
behaviors are socially desirable. 110 Because it is likely that donating bone
marrow to save the life of another would be held by many to be socially
desirable, subjects were asked to evaluate whether a third person would choose
to donate in the situation described. It is hoped that the results are, therefore,
more accurate estimates of the number of people who would actually donate
in each situation.
1. Method
A group of 170 undergraduate students in introductory psychology classes
at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln participated in the research in order to
partially fulfill a course research requirement. The students had the option to
do library research as an alternative to research participation.
The study utilized a hypothetical vignette about a decision whether to
donate bone marrow. The vignette detailed a situation in which the actor was
confronted with another person's need for a life saving bone marrow transplant
and with the fact that his tissue matches that of the ill person's. The prospective
donor was described as very fearful of medical procedures including needles.
The ten versions of the vignette were identical except for the key phrases that
described the relationship between the actor and the recipient and those that
described the uniqueness of the actor's ability to donate. The relationship was
varied such that the actor was either the recipient's father, brother, brother who
was raised separately, 11 friend, or fellow community member. The uniqueness
of the actor's ability to donate was varied in that eitherhe was the only potential
donor or there was an additional potential donor. In the cases where there was
a second potential donor, both held the same relationship to the recipient (i.e.,
where the actor was the recipient's brother, the second potential donor was a
brother as well). All the actors and recipients in the vignettes were held constant
as males except where the second potential donor was the other parent - the
mother.
The subjects were asked to indicate whether the actor would donate bone
marrow on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 indicating that the actor would definitely

109

Allen L. Edwards, Relationship Between Probability of Endorsement and Social

Desirability Scale Valuefora Set of 2,824 PersonalityStatements,50 J.APPLIED PSYCHOL. 238
(1966); DOUGLAS P. CROWNE & DAVID MARLOWE THE APPROVAL MOTIVE: STUDIES IN
EVALUATIVE DEPENDENCE (1964); Douglas P. Crowne &David Marlowe, A New Scale of
Social DesirabilityIndependent of Psychopathology,24 J.CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 349 (1960);
Allen L. Edwards, The Relationship Between the Judged Desirability of a Trait and the
Probabilitythat the Trait will be Endorsed, 37J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 90 (1953).
110
Crowne & Marlowe, supranote 109, at 13.
111
The relationship of siblings raised apart was included to approximate the facts of
Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1319, in which the court declined to authorize a bone marrow
transplant between half siblings who did not know each other.
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donate and 5 indicating that the actor would definitely not donate.11 2 The
subjects were then asked to specify the importance of several factors
(relationship, uniqueness, desire to help, and fear of the procedure) to the
decision on a scale of I (very important) to 5 (not at all important).
Subjects were assigned to conditions through a block randomization
procedure. One set of ten vignettes (one of each version) was randomly ordered
and distributed to subjects, followed by the next set of 10, and so on. Each
subject responded to one version of the vignette; therefore, a total of 17 subjects
responded to each version.
2. Results
Overall, the mean decision rating was 1.93. The mean ratings for each of the
ten groups are given in Table 1 and range from 1.35 (for a parent as the sole
prospective donor) to 2.65 (for a community member as one of two prospective
donors). Overall, 134 of the 170 participants (78.8%) answered on the end of
the scale indicating that the actor would definitely donate or was likely to
donate (ratings of 1 and 2 respectively). 113 For the specific group of interest,
siblings where no other donor is available, 15 of the 17 subjects (88.2%)
responded that the actor would definitely or was likely to donate. 114
Table 1: Mean Ratings for Relationship by Uniqueness
Donor's Relationship to Recipient
Parent

Sibling

Friend

Rise& Community XApart Member

Potetial
Donor

1.35

1.88

1.71

1.65

2.18

1.754a

Non-Unique
Potential
Donor

1.59

1.76

2.12

2.41

2.65

2.106 a

X

1.47 bc

1.82d

1.915

2.03b

2.415cd

Uniqueness
Uni ue

1 = would definitely donate 3= neutral 5 = would definitely not donate
Pairs of letters indicate statistically significant differences at p < .05.

112This study did not address the moral or social dimensions of decisions to donate

or not to donate bone marrow. The subjects were asked whether or not the actor would

donate but not whether the actor should donate. It is possible that if adults commonly
endorse or approve of decisions to donate bone marrow to critically ill siblings, there
may be psychological benefits to children to do the socially condoned behavior. This is
an area which could be explored by future research.
11354 of the subjects responded that the actor would definitely donate; 84 subjects
responded that the actor was likely to donate.
1145 of the subjects responded that the actor would definitely donate; 10 subjects
responded that the actor was likely to donate.
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The decision ratings were analyzed using a between groups ANOVA
procedure in order to investigate whether there were differences in ratings
among the ten groups. Statistical analysis revealed a significant overall main
effect of donor-recipient relationship (F(1,160) = 6.986, p = .001, Mse = .565).
Overall, different relationships between the prospective donor and the
recipient resulted in different mean ratings of donation likelihood. To
determine specifically which groups had significantly different mean ratings,
follow-up analysis was done using Bonferroni's multiple comparison
correction procedure as well as Fisher's protected follow-up procedure. Both
of these procedures revealed that subjects rated both parents and siblings as
significantly more likely to decide to donate than community members
(F(1,160) = 26.8698, p < .005, Mse = .565 and F(1,160) = 10.6521, p < .005, Mse =
.565, respectively) and rated parents as more likely to donate than siblings
raised separately (F(1,160) = 9.4358, p < .005, Mse = .565).1 15

Analysis also revealed a significant main effect of the uniqueness of the
donor's ability to donate (F(1,160) = 9363, p = .003, Mse = 565), with subjects

assessing the actor's likeliness to donate as being higher when he is the only
possible donor than when there is another potential donor. This effect was
driven by the relatively larger simple effects of uniqueness that occurred when
the recipient was a brother raised separately,116 a friend, 117 or a community
118
member.
No significant interaction was shown between the donor-recipient
relationship and the uniqueness of the donor's ability to donate as they
influence the decision rating (F(1,160) = 1.568, p = .180, Mse = .565).119
115
The reported values are statistically significant using Bonferroni's multiple
comparison procedure. No significant differences in rating were found by either
procedure between parent and sibling (F(1,160) = 3.6858, p > .05, Mse = .565), sibling
and friend (F(1,160) = .2715, p > .05, Mse = .565), sibling and a sibling raised separately
(F(1,160) = 1.3269,p> .05, Mse= .565), and friend anda sibling raised separately (F(1,160)
= .3979, p> .05, Mse = .565). Using theFisher's protected multiple comparison correction
procedure, additional significant differences were found between the ratings ofa sibling
raised separately and a community member (F(1,160) = 4.4599, p < .05, Mse = .565), a
friend and a community member (F(1,160) = 7.5221, p < .05, Mse = .565) and a parent
and a friend (F(1,160) = 5.9583, p < .05, Mse = .565). Future research should attempt to
more closely assess the differences, or lack thereof, between these types of relationships.
116
This was the only simple effect that was statistically significant (F(1,33) = 11.3613,
p = .0020, Mse = .4375).

117 F(1,33) = 2.6667, p = .1123, Mse =.5404.
118F(1,33) = 2.6945, p = .1105, Mse =.6985.
119
Some question is left regarding the interaction between relationship and donor
uniqueness. While no significant interaction was found (F(1,160) = 1.568, p = .180, Mse
= .565), the p-value for this interaction (p = .180) is relatively small. This could mean
that there is, in fact, no interaction between donor-recipient relationship and donor
uniqueness or this result could be due to sampling or to low statistical power. The main
effect for uniqueness is driven by the statistically significant simple effect of uniqueness
for a brother raised separately (F(1,33) = 11.3613, p = .0020, Mse = .4375) and the
relatively large (but not statistically significant) differences for a community member
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V. DiscussION

As discussed above, courts operate from a view of human behavior that
suggests to them that they typically ought to allow minors to donate bone
marrow to their ill siblings when there is a close sibling relationship and when
there is no alternative course of treatment for the sick child.1 2 0 Regardless of
the standard applied by the courts, the result is that these harvests are generally
authorized by the courts unless the relationship is attenuated or there are
alternatives to the harvest. 121 The results of this study shed some light on these
assumptions made by courts by indicating how competent adults would
choose to behave.
The data reported above indicate that as measured on a scale of 1 to 5
(definitely donate (1) to definitely not donate (5)), people are, in general, likely
to donate bone marrow (average rating = 1.93). More specifically, the mean
rating for the group rated as the least likely to donate, community members
with a non-unique ability to donate (2.65), is still less than the scale mid-point
of 3.00 (neutral). This suggests that regardless of relationship or uniqueness,
subjects indicated that actors would be at least somewhat likely to donate bone
marrow. Thus, given the opportunity, even donating bone marrow to a stranger
was thought to be a socially likely behavior. In addition, however, the mean
rating for the group most likely to donate, parents with a unique ability to
donate (1.35), is greater than 1.00, indicating that not all subjects rated the
decision as absolutely clear.
With respect to the specific group of interest, prospective donors who are
siblings of the recipient where there is no other available donor, the data
suggests that the factors considered by courts may affect decisions. The data
demonstrated that siblings were rated as significantly more likely to donate
bone marrow than were people who only had a community tie to the
recipient 2 2 Further, the data revealed that for all prospective donors, whether
there was another available donor had a significant effect on the decision.
However, although the results indicate that siblings with a unique ability to
donate were rated slightly more likely to donate than were those siblings for

and a friend (F(1,33) =2.6667, p =.1123, Mse = .5404 and F(1,33) = 2.6945, p = .1105, Mse
= .6985, respectively). This is consistent with the expected interaction pattern that the
number of donors is less likely to matterwhen recipient is a family member because the
actor would be willing to donate regardless of whether there are other potential donors
(uniqueness is more likely to weigh inwhen the recipient is less close/unknown).Future
research should continue to attempt to examine the precise nature of the interaction
relationship.
120See supra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
12 1

See supra note 60 for a discussion of those cases in which a harvest was not
authorized.
122

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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whom an alternative was available, 12 3 this factor was not statistically
significant, possibly because siblings would be willing to donate to their
brother or sister regardless of the other options.
A. A Revised Substituted Judgment Standard
The decision that a majority of people would make in similar circumstances
may be a helpful piece of information that courts may use in substituting
judgment for individuals who are incompetent to give legal consent. Courts
have made clear that majority public opinion is not dispositive in the context
of a substituted judgment. For example the court in Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz warned that:
[S]tatistical factors indicating that a majority of competent persons
similarly situated choose treatment [do not] resolve the issue. The
significant decisions of life are more complex than statistical
determinations. Individual choice is determined not by the vote of the
majority but by the complexities of the singular situation viewed
124 from
the perspective of the person called on to make the decision.
Adults do not always make the statistically likely choice. This was made clear
by one commentator who pointed out that competent adults have refused to
participate in bone marrow transplants even when there was little risk to
them, 125 while other competent adults have participated in riskier activities to
help another even though failure was likely.126 Respect for persons demands
that the individual be allowed to choose an unpopular or even irrational
option.
However, in the case of an individual who has never been legally competent,
such as a minor, there is little evidence of the person's needs, values, and
desires. Substituted judgment is always a prediction, but when the child is able
to give some assent to the harvest there is evidence of the child's current
preferences. Although there is no prior period of legal competency, the
substituted judgment standard can take into account present and future
preferences in a "previewed judgment." Robertson identified the interests to be
considered in the situation of a minor who "will attain competency in the
future.... The interests to be maximized include the incompetent's existing
tastes and preferences and the tastes and preferences the person is likely to have
in the future when competent. Since the latter are unknowable, it would be in
his interest to preserve maximum flexibility."127 In this situation, evidence of

123This difference was very small with only 0.12 points separating the groups. See
table 1.
124

Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 428.

125

See, e.g., McFall, 10 Pa. D.&C.3d at 90.

126

Adams, supra note 22, at 580.

127

Robertson, supra note 81, at 66.
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majority sentiment, of what a reasonable person would decide, would be
helpful as a statistical indication of what this particular person would decide.
For example, if 90% of people in the same or similar circumstances as the
individual would make a given decision, then, although it cannot be known
with certainty how the individual would have decided were he or she legally
capable, absent any other evidence, there is a 90%likelihood that the individual
would make that same decision.
Courts have recognized the usefulness of this "indirect evidence." 128 In
Saikewicz, the court considered evidence that most people in the incompetent's
situation in that case would elect chemotherapy as an appropriate indicator of
what he would have wanted. The court stated:
Evidence that most people would or would not act in a certain way is
certainly an important consideration in attempting to ascertain the
predilections of any individual, but care must be taken, as in any
analogy, to ensure that operative
factors are similar or at least to take
129
notice of the dissimilarities.
In the bone marrow context, courts have identified the "operative factors" as
including a close sibling relationship and the unavailability of alternative
1
treatments. 30
The study presented above shows that, under the circumstances identified
by the courts as operative, siblings where no alternative is available, 88.2%
responded with a I or a 2 rating indicating that they would definitely or
probably donate bone marrow. Thus, it could be argued that, all else being
equal, there is an 88.2% chance that the minor would, if competent, be most
likely to choose to donate bone marrow to his or her sibling. Although, as
discussed below,131 the courts are unclear as to what degree of certainty is
required, if even more certainty were required, the number of people who
would definitely donate would be useful instead. Five of 17, or 29.4% of the
subjects, responded that the actor would definitely donate. Thus, all else being
equal, there is a 29.4% likelihood that a minor would, if competent, definitely
choose to donate.
The size of the majority in agreement with a given decision that is sufficient
depends, in part, upon the standard of proof to be applied. Courts have
identified three standards of proof: proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
which requires that the object of proof be more likely than not (this is used in
most civil cases); the intermediate clear and convincing standard, used in "ex-

128

Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
1d. at 429. The court took such notice of the dissimilarities between the individual
and the majority on the operative factors in deciding that treatment should not be given.
Id. at 430.
130
See supra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
129

131

See infra notes 132-147 and accompanying text.
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ceptional civil matters;" 132 and the strict proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard which is used in criminal cases. If the standard of proof is by a
preponderance of the evidence, a smaller majority would be acceptable than if
the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, if 60% of
people would make a given decision, this would be an indication, without any
more evidence, that the individual in question would be more likely than not
to make that same decision (proof by a preponderance of the evidence).
However, this same 60% majority alone would not be an indication that the
individual would, beyond a reasonable doubt, choose that same course of
action.
In the "right to die" area, the area in which substituted judgment is
predominantly used, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that it is permissible
for a state to require proof of the individual's wishes by clear and convincing
evidence. 133 However, the Court did not require the use of this standard. In the
bone marrow context, most courts are not explicit about which standard of
proof they are applying, using language such as "strong evidence," 134
"substantial evidence,"135 or "clearly.' 136 The court in Curranv. Bosze discussed
the substituted judgment standard extensively, and stated that such a standard
requires proof by clear and convincing evidence, but then rejected the
substituted judgment standard for making bone marrow donation decisions in
favor of the best interest standard. 137 The court then found that the evidence
"supported" the conclusion that the donation was not in the children's best
interest.138 In In re Matter of Doe, another best interests case, the court held that,
"[r]egardless of the standard of proof that should be required in cases of this
type, the record before us demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that
the procedure [bone marrow transplant] is in the incompetent donor's best
interests."13 9 Thus, it is not clear from the cases what standard of proof the
courts use in this context (the substituted judgment standard or the best interest
standard).
Even if it were clear what standard of proof was used, it would still not be
clear how substantial a majority would be required to meet that standard. There
1321n re Doe, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
133

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Noting that the
interests at stake in a right-to-die case are "more substantial . .. [than] a run-of-the-mine
civil dispute," the Court allowed the state to "place an increased risk of an erroneous
decision on those seeking to terminate an incompetent individual's life-sustaining
treatment." Id. at 283.
134
Little, 576 S.W.2d at 500.
135

Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 149.

1361n re Richardson, 284 So. 2d at 186.
137566 N.E.2d at 1322-31.
138Id.at 1345.
139481 N.Y.S.2d at 933.
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has been empirical research that has attempted to quantify standards of
proof. 140 Simon and Mahan found that judges and students assigned an
average probability of 89% to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, while
jurors assigned an average probability of 79% to this standard. 141 The court in
United States v. Faticoreported a study of federal judges in the Eastern District
of New York whose responses in quantifying the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard ranged from 76% to 95%.142 Regarding the preponderance of the
evidence standard, Simon and Mahan found that this standard was assigned
average probabilities of 61% by judges, 76% by students, and 77% by jurors. 143
The court in Fatico,however, reported that the judges variously quantified the
preponderance of the evidence standard as more than 50%, 50.1%, and 51%.144
The clear and convincing standard falls in between these. While Simon and
Mahan did not include the clear and convincing standard in their study, the
court in Fatico reported estimates ranging from 60% to 75%.145 In addition,
another survey of federal judges found a mean rating for the clear and
convincing standard of 74.9%.146 These wide ranges and overlapping values
indicate that it is unclear what level of probability is indicated by any given
standard of proof. 147 Even if it is not possible or desirable to articulate a

140

See Rita James Simon, Judges' Translations of Burdens of Proof into Statements of
Probability,13 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 103 (1969); Rita James Simon, 'Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt" - An Experimental Attempt at Quantification, 6 J. APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 203 (1970);
Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof. A View from the Bench,
the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAw & Soc'y REV. 319 (1971). See also Francis C. Dane, In
Search of Reasonable Doubt: A Systematic Examinationof Selected QuantificationApproaches,
9 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 141 (1985) (comparing various methods of quantifying standards
of proof) and Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions
of Standardsof Proof,9 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 159 (1985) (comparing jury instructions in
legal form, in quantified form, and in both for their effects of verdicts).
141Simon & Mahan, supra note 140, at 324.
142458 F. Supp. at 410.
143

Simon & Mahan, supra note 140, at 327.
144458 F. Supp. at 410.
145
146

1d.

C.MA. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
ConstitutionalGuarantees?35 VAND. L. REV. 1293,1328 (1982) (active, senior, and retired
federal judges).
147
Indeed, many commentators and jurists have argued not only that quantification
is difficult, but that it is inappropriate. Tribe exemplifies this view:
Of course the law could determine a numerical quantification on the level
of doubt which is permissible. But the point is that the law does not do this.
It leaves the standard of satisfaction vague. It requires a credibility statement that the facts in issue occurred beyond reasonable doubt and not a
statistical statement that the probability of the facts in issue is 0.99 or 0.999
and so on.
Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1329, 1375 (1971). The Supreme Court has stated that "even if the particular
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probability for the standard of proof to be applied, the same general principle
operates in that the stricter the standard of proof to be applied, the more
evidence (the more substantial majority) will be required.
In sum, in applying empirical evidence about how a substantial number of
competent adults would behave under the circumstances, courts must
compare the minority with the majority on the operative factors (here these are
the sibling relationship and the lack of acceptable alternatives), articulate the
appropriate standard of proof, and then apply the standard of proof to the
evidence. When these or other operative factors indicate that the incompetent
individual would not have decided as would most people, he or she must not
be forced to conform to the majority.148 By the same token, one who would,
indeed, act in accordance with the majority must not be forced to act against
the grain. Given no other information about the individual, 49 and given a
match with the majority on the operative factors, the chances that the substitute
decision will conform to the incompetent individual's actual choice is greater
if the decision is made as the majority of people would have made it.
However, there is often more information on which to rely. When the minor
is at least able to voice his or her assent to the harvest, the statistical results are
only needed to bolster that assent. This would be a subjective form of
substituted judgment that, instead of speculating about what the person would
do if competent, would rely on what the minor would do if he or she had the
legal capacity to decide. In other words, courts can expand the legal weight
given to the minor's subjective choices even though he or she does not meet
the standard for legal competence. Robertson noted:
If the incompetent lacks the capacity to communicate his preferences
in the ways that people ordinarily do, it may be more difficult or
perhaps impossible to know them. If he somehow communicates
preferences, his very incompetency means that his preferences are not
necessarily to be honored. But it would be erroneous to conclude that
none of the expressed wants of incompetents should be satisfied.
Incompetency encompasses several types of mental impairment,
including the inability to have certain wants, the possession of bizarre
wants, or the inability to choose among or satisfy conflicting
preferences. Thus some expressed wants, if they appear irrational and
indicative of his incompetency (such as a desire to fly) need not be
standard-of-proof catchwords donot always make a greatdifference in a particular case,
adopting a 'standard of proof is more than an empty semantic exercise.' In cases
involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a
minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.'" Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153,1166 (CA4 1971)
(concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. dismissed sub nom. Murel v. Baltimore
City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)).
148 See, e.g., McFall,10 Pa. D.&C.3d at 90; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 429.
14 9
Even Strunk, the only case to state that it was using the substituted judgement
standard, used other information (i.e., the best interest of the child). 445 S.W.2d at 149.
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honored. Expressed wants not in this category, however, should be
satisfied. Clearly, they defineJ
1 °inpart, his interests, of which respect for
persons must take account. 9
Thus, the expressed assent of the minor combined with evidence indicating
that most competent adults would choose to donate under similar
circumstances provides the confidence required to substitute judgment for the
minor while still respecting his or her personhood.
It is possible that the prospective minor donor may be so young that he or
she is unable to communicate a preference regarding the potential bone
marrow harvest. Under these circumstances, it may not be possible to have the
requisite confidence to substitute judgment for the minor. Accordingly, it
would then be appropriate to make a decision regarding the child or
adolescent's participation under the best interest standard. "Where his wishes
or intentions have not been articulated and cannot be known, the existence of
net benefits serves as a convenient surrogate for determining what he would
have chosen, because it is reasonable to assume that an incompetent would
want that which benefits him."151 Use of this standard, however, must take into
account the interest the minor has in behaving altruistically as well as the moral
152
nature of the decision as described in the following section.
If the minor expresses the desire to not participate in the bone marrow
harvest, such lack of assent by the minor should be taken seriously. However,
in addition to protecting the minor's subjective choices, there is a need to
protect children from the possibility of poor decisions that could have
far-reaching effects. It is possible that the minor's refusal stems from irrational
fears, such as fear of needles or hospitals, and as such are indicative of the
minor's incompetence. Robertson would argue that these types of desires need
not be honored. 153 However, while it should not be dispositive, the minor's
refusal should be considered in the analysis of best interest as described in the
following section. Such analysis may require stronger evidence of benefit than
would be required to allow the harvest to proceed on a minor with no
articulated preference.
B. A Revised Approach to Best Interests
An alternative or complimentary approach1 54 to better ensure that minor
bone marrow donors' interests in self-determination and in acting altruistically
150

Robertson, supra note 81, at 67.

51

1 1d. at 57.
152

See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.

153

Robertson, supra note 81, at 67.
This revised best interest approach could operate as an independent standard for
all minors. Alternately, it could be utilized as a compliment to the revised approach to
substituted judgment, operating in those circumstances in which substituting judgment
154

is not appropriate. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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are protected, is in a restructuring of the best interest of the child standard.
Within the best interests standard itself, the law may give realistic protection
of the self-determination and selflessness of potential minor donors. However,
to do so requires an articulation of appropriate factors for courts to balance in
reaching their determinations that includes the wishes of the minor. Such
factors might include: the minor's capacity to appreciate the risks and benefits
of a bone marrow harvest; the minor's capacity to appreciate the nature of the
potential recipient's condition; the minor's relationship to the potential
recipient; the minor's wishes regarding the harvest; the parent's wishes
regarding the harvest; the availability of a primary caregiver to provide
emotional support to the minor; and the risks and benefits of the procedure to
the minor (including psychological risks and benefits if they can be reasonably
estimated).
This best interests test includes the minor's wishes as an important factor to
be considered in determining whether a harvest is appropriate. The minor's
wishes are included in the test, not to assist the court in substituting judgment
for the minor, but because protecting the minor's ability to decide is likely to
advance the minor's best interests. The minor's preference will allow factors
of altruism, compassion, and courage to be included in the decision, through
the minor's own input, rather than through the decision-making of a
substitute. 155
Such a restructured best interest of the child standard allows courts to
evaluate the minor's wishes in light of the minor's understanding of the
recipient's condition as well as of the bone marrow harvest itself. Considerable
weight could be given to the wishes of children and adolescents who display
a basic understanding of the situation. Alternately, minors who do not manifest
such an understanding would not have their wishes considered as strongly.
Thus, as under the substituted judgment standard as reevaluated above, the
basis of the minor's desires ought to be considered and used to assign weight
to those desires in the best interests balancing.
Accordingly, the assent of a minor who displays a basic understanding of
the situation ought to be given substantial weight, while the assent of a minor
who does not show this basic comprehension ought to be considered less
15 5 This respect for the child's wishes should not be taken to mean that all minors who
are so capable must be forced to express a preference. Buchanan and Brock expressed
this concern:

Nothing in our analysis above or the policy implications discussed below
implies that children should be forced, pressured, or even encouraged to
decide about health care for themselves when they do not wish to do so.
If a child, for example, does not feel emotionally prepared to take responsibility for a difficult treatment decision, then even if his or her other
decision-making capacities appear well-developed it could be harmful to
the child to have to take responsibility for the decision. Waiver by competent adults of their right to give informed consent and their transfer of that
right to others is well recognized in medical practice, medical ethics, and
the law, and deserves to be equally honored for competent minors.
BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 14, at 240.
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important in the balance. Similarly, the expressed desire of a minor not to
participate in the harvest ought to be given more emphasis in the balance when
that minor manifests a basic understanding. In the case of a minor's refusal to
participate, however, the court ought to look, in acidition, at the reasons for the
refusal in order to determine whether they are, as Robertson put it, "indicative
of his incompetency."156 If the minor is unable or unwilling to express a
preference, then the balancing analysis may continue without the child's
wishes as a factor. In all cases, however, the value of acting for the benefit of
another ought to be considered in the weighing process.
The best interest of the child standard, as described here, includes
self-determination as an important factor to be considered in cases in which
the prospective donor, even if not legally competent, can articulate his or her
wishes regarding a bone marrow harvest within the context of his or her
understanding of the existing situation. While the revised standard continues
the use of weighing factors to determine best interests, it includes moral
interests in self-determination and altruism as worthy of consideration.
VI. CONCLUSION

There are several approaches that courts take to the difficult question of
whether a healthy minor ought to be allowed to donate bone marrow to a
critically ill sibling and different legal underpinnings are utilized to analyze the
problem of informed consent in this area. The mature minor doctrine, the
substituted judgment standard, the best interest of the child standard, and
court review of the fairness and reasonableness of a parental decision, have all
been relied on by courts in addressing these issues. However, none of these
standards has provided an entirely satisfactory framework in which to base
these decisions: the mature minor doctrine does not apply to the majority of
cases; the substituted judgment standard fails in the face of concerns about
prediction; and the best interests and parental review standards fail to
accurately reflect the moral nature of decisions whether to donate tissue.
The proposed modified standards attempt to remedy these deficiencies. The
revised substituted judgment standard combines empirical data
demonstrating decisions under the factors courts have defined as operative
with the assent of the minor to enhance confidence in predicting what that
minor would decide if competent to do so. In cases in which the assent of the
child is unavailable or untrustworthy, reliance must instead be placed on a
modified best interests of the child standard. This revised best interest
approach (which may also operate as an independent standard for all minors)
attempts to introduce the wishes of minors who comprehend the situation and
the value of altruism into the best interest balancing equation. These revised
standards provide a more solid legal grounding for decisions involving minors
and bone marrow donations and incorporate a greater degree of respect for the
choices of minors.
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